








A Coevolutionary Approach to Understanding the  
Paradox of Social Pressures versus Economic  
Efficiency Across the World’s Food Chains 
 
Desmond Ng, Randall E. Westgren, and Steven Sonka 
  


















  Department of Rural Economy 
Faculty of Agriculture, Forestry  
and Home Economics 








A Coevolutionary Approach to Understanding the Paradox of Social 
Pressures versus Economic Efficiency Across the World’s Food Chains 
 
Desmond Ng, Randall E. Westgren, and Steven Sonka 
  

























The authors  are, respectively, Assistant Professor, Department of Rural Economy, University 
of Alberta; Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; and Professor, National Soybean Research 
Laboratory, Peabody University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
 
Copyright 2002 by Desmond Ng, Randall Westgren and Steven Sonka. All rights reserved. 
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any 
means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
 
The purpose of the Rural Economy ‘Staff Papers’ series is to provide a forum to accelerate the 
presentation of issues, concepts, ideas and research results within the academic and 
professional community. Staff Papers are published without peer review.  1 
A Coevolutionary Approach to Understanding the Paradox of Social Pressures versus 
Economic Efficiency Across the World’s Food Chains 
 
 
  In recent years considerable social pressure has been brought to bear on commodity food chains 
throughout the world.  Events such as the introduction of bioengineered crops, the discovery of BSE in 
beef and instances of food contamination directly leading to human illness have focused attention on the 
food supply chain.  Traditionally the operations of commodity-based food chains attracted relatively 
little attention from anyone not directly involved in agriculture and food systems.  And, even within 
those logistical and marketing systems, their low margins and scale efficiencies tended to inhibit 
innovation. 
  Now, however, the tension between social pressures and food chain economic efficiency has 
become an issue of concern.  On the one hand, loud voices “demand” rapid and dramatic change to the 
commodity-based system to provide each consumer with any physical and information attribute that 
might be of interest.  Conversely sector decision makers know that consumers, voting with their 
pocketbooks, will discipline those food chains that venture too far in adding costs to final products.    
This setting extends beyond, however, the normal marketing question of whether sufficient 
numbers of consumers will buy a new product and at a sufficiently high price to attain profitability.  In 
food chains today, decision makers are besieged with messages that are contradictory and paradoxical.  
For example, at the same time that there is a potential threat that US commodity exports are being 
restrained because of international resistance to bioengineered crops, US soybean and cotton exports 
(both primarily produced from bioengineered seeds) are at record levels (Abbott, 2001).   
  Because every supply chain is a collection of economic transactions, it is natural to expect 
economic analysis to be able to provide insights as to the future directions of the food system.  Stated 
very simply, one would expect that, if consumers are willing to pay for additional product attributes 
(both physical and informational), agricultural and food systems would respond to provide those 
attributes.  However, it is always difficult to estimate what consumers will actually pay for attributes 
they are not now receiving.  And specific consumer segments, potentially delineated by income, 
geography, demographics or several other criteria, may have markedly different preferences for these 2 
attributes.  Food chains, themselves, are systems and change often requires substantial initial 
investment, which can forestall innovation even if in the long run such change would be economic.  
Further, if the presence or absence of a certain attribute is imposed by government regulation, the 
competitive dynamics of change can be significantly different than would be the case if such regulations 
didn’t exist.   
  Despite these complexities, private and public sector decision makers with interest in food 
supply chains have to make decisions today whose outcomes will be significantly affected by the future 
resolution of these paradoxes.  The purpose of this paper is to describe an innovative conceptual 
approach and to present a specific analytical framework that can be employed to enhance our 
understanding of the” paradoxical” forces pressing for change and the likely future directions of change.    
These paradoxical forces underscore a conceptual dilemma confronted by organizational 
theorists. Changes in markets such as those dictated by the increasingly discriminating food consumer 
are considered as an exogenous market force that drives the dictates of food market activities. This 
exogenous influence places primary emphasis on the “deterministic” forces of the market dictating 
future market changes (Astley and Van De Ven, 1983). Conversely, “voluntaristic” viewpoints (Astely 
and Van de Ven, 1983) contend that purposeful behavior of food sector participants can alter the 
demands of food consumers. Such diametrical positions reflect the polar arguments of market pulling 
and technology pushing forces that confront food market systems today.  In contrast, the analysis 
framework advanced here employs a coevolutionary perspective (Baum and Singh, 1994; Lewin and 
Volberda, 1999) to explain the organizational-environmental interrelations confronting food supply 
chains.  These coevolutionary processes exploit complex and dynamic relationships spanning different 
levels of aggregation (Baum and Singh, 1994).  
To make this coevolutionary perspective operational, the paper’s conceptual approach draws 
from complexity theory (Jantsch, 1980; McKelvey, 1999), Austrian economics (Hayek, 1967; Kirzner, 
1979) and social networking (Granovetter, 1973) to better understand the effect of paradoxical forces 
through complex coevolutionary processes.  This coevolutionary approach incorporates both 
perspectives, environmental determinism and the voluntaristic pursuits of managerial choice, as 3 
reciprocally interdependent where each shapes the impact of the other. This approach not only improves 
our understanding of the complexity of paradoxical influences that impact food market systems but also 
presents an alternative viewpoint of organizational-environmental relations. In addition, this framework 
provides analytical advances in its use novel use of agent-based modeling (Lane, 1993) in a specific 
agricultural supply chain context.   
The remainder of the paper is comprised of the following sections.  First, the underpinnings of 
the suggested approach, and its links to complexity theory, Austrian economics, and social networking, 
will be detailed. Such an approach provides the conceptual basis to understanding coevolutionary 
processes.  Then, the approach will be defined within the context of a specific modeling framework and 
application to a food market chain.  Finally, implications for application will be presented. 
Conceptual Approach 
  In reality (and for purposes of this paper), food supply chains exist as complex systems (Ng, 
2001).  Organizations of varying size and scope are interlinked within these chains.  For example a 
multinational chemical company’s product may be sold to thousands of farmers through a cooperative 
owned by part but not by all of those farmer customers.  Farm output typically is aggregated from those 
farms and then processed into food products for consumers.  Again often firms of varying organizational 
form, size, and scope perform the processing, distribution and retail functions.  Governmental and other 
non-profit organizations also affect the effectiveness of food chain operations and can be impediments 
and/or catalysts for change.  Their influence is often included within the context of the business and 
general environment surrounding the food chain. Although one food chain is comprised of numerous 
linkages, the global food sector is the amalgamation of all such chains that differ geographically and 
culturally.  Both individual food chains and the totality of the global food sector co-exist as inter-related 
complex systems. 
An Overview of Complexity Science 
  Although originating in the biological and physical sciences, complexity theory has started to 
receive interest from economists, organization and management theorists (Lewin, 1999). A distinctive 
feature of complexity science is its attention to the joint roles of micro and macro influence in shaping 4 
the trajectory of a system’s evolution, what Prigonine and Stengers (1984) refer to as “contemporary 
determinism”.  
From a complexity science perspective, coevolution is a result of the decentralized properties of 
a complex system (Kauffman, 1993).  A complex system consists of micro entities (i.e. people, ants, 
molecules etc.) with “stochastic and idiosyncratic” behaviors whose collective interactions yield non-
linear feedback behaviors (McKelvey, 1999). The decentralized orientation of complex systems allows 
for the depiction of evolving, multi and bi-directional causal relations among the micro entities 
comprising such a system (Baum and Singh, 1994; McKelvey, 1999).  Within a network setting, these 
complex interactions coevolve as the behavior of any one micro entity inter-relates with the behaviors of 
others (Kauffman, 1993). 
Nested Coevolution: Local And Macro Levels of Organization 
Based on these properties of a complex system, the coevolution of organization-environmental 
relations is driven by a "nested” hierarchal process (Baum and Singh, 1994). Nested hierarchies consists 
of part and whole relationships where "wholes are composed of parts at lower levels of organization, 
and are themselves parts of more extensive wholes" (Baum and Singh, 8, 1994) such that reciprocal 
interactions occur at not only within different levels of aggregation, but also between such levels. For 
example, some individual farmers perceive that there are gains to be had from producing crops 
organically or without the use of bioengineered seeds because some consumers have expressed a desire 
for such products.  In many instances, connecting the consumers to those sources of farm output 
requires the collaboration and involvement of collection, processing and distribution entities. Such 
collaborations consist of complex social and economic relations that extend beyond farm production 
sectors to include other food chain participants and, thus, each individual contributes or is ‘part’ of the 
greater functioning and behavior of the ‘whole’ food chain system.  
Drawing from the decentralized property of complex systems, lower levels of organization 
consist of  “local” coevolutionary processes. “Local” coevolution involves a reciprocal interaction 
between the behavior of the individual micro entity and its environment consisting of interactions and 
behaviors of other micro entities in its “local” vicinity (Kauffman, 1993). Through interactive 5 
influences, changes brought upon by the behavior of a micro entity influence the “local” environment 
and in turn changes in this environment affect the behavior of the micro entity. As a decentralized 
system is comprised of many such interacting entities, this local coevolution occurs in "parallel" for 
every individual in a complex system. As a result, "local coevolutionary" processes in one region of a 
complex system impact "local coevolutionary" processes in other regions (Kauffman, 1993). Kauffman 
(1993) describes these local interactive behaviors as a "patching" process.  
The collective behaviors of these “local” coevolutionary processes comprise the “macro” 
environment in which this macro environment exhibits a distinct behavior separate from local processes. 
This imparts a nested coevolutionary logic. That is, the composite behavior of all such local 
coevolutionary processes is “nested” within a higher level of macro organization to which such macro 
behavior is more than the sum of behaviors among local coevolutionary processes. This reflects a non-
linear property of complex systems where complex behaviors such as bifurcations, edge of chaos and 
chaotic macro expressions can occur (Kauffman, 1993).  
Nested Coevolution: Non-Linear Behavior Of Positive And Negative Feedback 
This nested coevolution consists of two dominant forms of non-linear interactions termed 
positive and negative feedback. Positive feedback self-amplifies the stochastic behavior of micro 
entities in causing “chaos” and the resulting destabilization of the macro behavior of a complex system 
(Jantsch, 1980). This is also termed a “bifurcation” event where opportunities for the reconfiguration of 
the internal system of relationships cause a symmetry breaking process to occur (Prigonine and 
Stengers, 1984).  
The significance of positive feedback in motivating the onset of “bifurcation” is that 
“individuals matter” in causing potentially a dramatic alteration to the internal arrangements of a 
complex system (Jantsch, 1980). Stated differently, an individual’s voluntaristic pursuits can cause 
widespread macro bifurcated change in food market systems. This is because positive feedback self-
amplifies the stochastic behaviors of micro entities to cause the bifurcation of not only local 
coevolutionary processes but, through positive feedback interactions to other local coevolutionary 
processes, can cause a macro or system wide bifurcation. This yields the deconstruction or radical 6 
transition in macro behaviors. Such an argument is consistent with Kauffman’s (1993) depiction of 
“edge of chaos” behaviors.  
One example of positive feedback and its related consequence of bifurcation is the use of 
information technology in the meat industry. Because of consumer concerns regarding food safety and 
other social factors, some meat processors are investing in information technology, which will allow for 
precise traceability between their output as specific cuts and meat products and the source of individual 
animals they purchased as input. If profits accrue from this innovation, the innovating firm will attempt 
to expand these capabilities.  Further, learning curve effects from use of these innovative resources 
should allow for operating costs to be reduced.  These forces act as positive feedback, not just to the 
innovative firm, but also to competing meat processors in the market. That is, the subsequent adoption 
of this innovation can yield self-reinforcing influences which in the extreme could result in the 
bifurcation of food chain markets. 
However, in mitigating the onset of “bifurcated” behaviors, negative feedback interactions 
exhibit a “macro deterministic” influence on local coevolutionary processes (Jantsch, 1980; Kauffman, 
1993). A system’s negative feedback consists of a dampening or equilibrating influence such that an 
initiated change caused by the stochastic behaviour of an individual is restored to the system’s long-
term equilibrium state (Jantsch, 1980). The system’s negative feedback behaviour, therefore, is 
responsible for maintaining a stable and predictable equilibrium (Jantsch, 1980). In the example of 
innovation to allow for traceability of meat cuts, the innovating firm may expect to receive premiums 
for its products with these information attributes.  However, the response of competitors (lowering 
prices and/or making their products more desirable through other means) could restrict the profits 
accruing from the innovation.  These negative feedback effects act to lessen the likelihood that the 
innovation will be successful and, in so doing, maintain the preceding equilibrium and mitigate 
potentially bifurcating behaviours. 
Although this negative feedback operates as a macro deterministic influence, such feedback 
originates from “self-organizing” processes found in local coevolution.  Specifically, in a complex 
system, local coevolutionary processes can give rise to the expression of “self-organizing behaviors” 7 
(Kauffman, 1993; McKelvey, 1999). In the absence of external intervention, “self-organization” refers 
to the internal experimentation of micro entities that yields the emergence of ordering structures 
(Kauffman, 1993).  A prerequisite for self organized behaviours is the existence of sufficient internal 
diversity or “stochastic idiosyncrasy” (McKelvey, 1999) to allow for ordering structures and behaviours 
to emerge (Kauffman, 1993).  Hence, so long as local processes consist of stochastic behaving agents, 
negative feedback influences can arise from the self-organizing behaviours found in such local 
processes. This negative feedback in turn acts as a macro deterministic force that exerts a dampening 
effect on those local coevolutionary processes that exhibit positive feedback. 
Consequently, through both positive and negative feedback interactions, the interplay of local 
and macro coevolutionary forces jointly shapes complex system behaviour. This interplay of non-linear 
behaviours drives the nested coevolution of organizational-environmental relations. However, since 
complexity and coevolutionary theories originate from physical and natural sciences, a “socialized” 
conception of this nested coevolutionary is developed from an Austrian economic perspective. 
Alert and Subjective Entrepreneurship 
Decentralized market processes are central to Austrian economics (Hayek, 1967). Therefore 
elements from Austrian economics are well suited to conceptualizing the decentralized orientation of the 
nested coevolutionary process of food supply chains. In particular, decentralized market processes arise 
from the subjective and alert tenets of Austrian economics (Ng, 2001). Subjectivism is based on the 
insight that every entrepreneur is purposeful in choosing plans based on their subjective perceptions, 
beliefs, wants, and knowledge. Subjectivism is also the basis for an entrepreneur’s “alertness” to grasp 
for undiscovered opportunities in the market environment (Kirzner, 1979). For example, providing 
wheat that is more consistent in its quality attributes can cut costs in the baking process and provides the 
potential for additional value for suppliers to baking companies.  Further, the existing low commodity 
prices encourage farmers and their representatives to search for options to create new sources of value. 
Hence, alertness can viewed as the discovery of “value added” possibilities in food chain systems. 
However, more formally, alertness is defined as an entrepreneur's intentionality to seek 
opportunities in an environment by recombining the diverse knowledge contained in plan choices of 8 
other subjective and alert entrepreneurs.  Because above normal returns (entrepreneurial profits) arise 
from asymmetric knowledge (Kirzner, 1979), alertness is the discovery of profit opportunities from 
recombining subjective knowledge experiences in a decentralized and "fragmented knowledge" market 
environment (Kirzner, 1979). Alertness can involve the seeking of opportunities from plan imitation, 
"revising" the failed plans of others (Kirzner, 1979), and Schumpeterian innovations. 
Local Social Coevolution: Entrepreneurship and Social Networks 
  Based on subjective and alert entrepreneurship, "local” coevolutionary interactions of a social 
dimension consist of reciprocal “social” interactions where an entrepreneur’s knowledge and behavior 
shapes and is shaped by the social knowledge or “social rules”(Hayek, 1967) of its local environment. 
With alert and subjective entrepreneurs, "local" interactions consist of the recombination and diffusion 
of the diverse knowledge or plan experiences in the entrepreneur’s social network. These social 
interactions are confined to interactions among the members of an entrepreneur’s social network. This is 
because subjectivism imparts “bounded rational behaviors” and, thus, social interactions are confined to 
local processes. As a result, this imparts the “local” dimension of coevolution. 
  Historically the connotation of local in agricultural and food systems implied relatively limited 
geographic areas.  The advent and adoption of information technologies, especially e-mail and the 
World Wide Web allows, even geographically remote, farmers and food sector decision makers access 
to a wider range of information sources.  Coupled with globalization, these technologies are changing 
the geographic dimensions of local networks (Sonka, et.al., 1999). However, even when augmented 
with technology, the “locality” of social interactions is nevertheless constrained by the cognitive limits 
imposed by subjectivism.  
Diffusion and recombination of knowledge in the local environment result in the emergence of 
"social rules". Through a process of dynamic competition (Hayek, 1978), each alert entrepreneur tries to 
discover better or cheaper ways of doings things by either drawing on their subjective knowledge 
experiences or by recombining the knowledge (i.e. plan choices) of others in the network so as to create 
an improved plan (Ng, 2001). Some plans will succeed, while others will fail.  Those plans that fail 
constitute “social rules” reflecting the collective knowledge experiences of past failed plans (Hayek, 9 
1967). However, for plans that succeed, social rules also reflect successful or “legitimate” (Scott, 1995) 
knowledge / plan experiences. 
The social rules of the local environment in turn build upon the individual entrepreneur’s 
existing knowledge allowing potentially more profitable plans to be formulated. However, the 
entrepreneur’s enacted plans in turn shape the development of social rules within the social network 
(Ng, 2001). As new plans are formed, failures and successes can arise and social rules become further 
shaped by the evolving knowledge experiences of alert entrepreneurship (Ng, 2001). As a result, an 
individual entrepreneur contributes to shaping the development of social rules, but is also shaped by the 
guidance influence of social rules in the social network.  The result is a reciprocal "local" coevolution of 
individual knowledge and social rules.   
Food industry practices or conventions employed in food markets are examples of social rules. 
As a response to low commodities prices and signals that consumers desire information as to how their 
food was produced as well as high quality food, a large number of efforts have been initiated to certify 
or provide quality assurance regarding the practices (i.e. formation of new social rules from alertness) 
used to produce agricultural output.  Not all of these competing systems are likely to be successful as 
social rules in the long run, although it seems likely that some will.   
Social Interactions: Social Networks and Non-Linear Behavior 
  Because this “localized” coevolutionary process is dependent upon social interactions, the 
entrepreneur's choice of social network relations of “weak information ties” and “strong information 
ties”(Granovetter, 1973) generate, respectively, positive and negative feedback behaviors (Ng, 2001).  
These information ties serve to capture the non-linear reciprocal relations found between local and 
macro coevolutionary processes. 
Positive feedback of innovative behaviors.   Positive feedback is characterized by those social 
interactions involving the exchange of knowledge among innovating entrepreneurs who form weak 
information ties (Ng, 2001). According to social network literature, “weak information ties” arise from 
information ties to dissimilar agents (Granovetter, 1973). Information transmission through weak 10 
information ties is, therefore, largely of novel content from the perspective of the individual 
entrepreneur.  
Weak information ties can fuel Schumpeterian innovation in the local network, if such ties 
result in novel recombination of resources (Ng, 2001).  The access to diverse sets of knowledge / plan 
choices provides for experimentation and, thus, innovation (Ng, 2001). As successful plan choices 
stimulate innovative rents, other “alert” entrepreneurs will strive to form weak information ties to the 
innovating entrepreneurs. A self-amplifying process of successive recombinations of plan choices leads 
to increasingly innovative plans. Therefore through this positive feedback process, an innovative 
entrepreneur who forms weak information ties can cause the bifurcation of the existing social rules and 
plan choices within the social network/local environment (Ng, 2001). 
Building upon this argument, local interactions from the formation of weak information ties can 
result in the bifurcation of not only one local social network, but also to the bifurcation of other 
networks and then to overall macro bifurcation.  The extent of such bifurcations is dependent on the 
extent of iterative interactions used to generate such self-amplifying influence (Kauffman, 1993). 
Therefore, the number of members in social networks with weak information ties to the bifurcating 
network affects the rate and extent of positive feedback behavior.  In today’s food system, some players 
in the food sector are likely to have much more extensive weak information ties than are others.  For 
example, a multinational food processor with operations in the United States and in Europe is being 
forced to deal with two very different social agendas that affect the sourcing of their inputs.  In the short 
run, operating efficiency is likely to be slightly reduced; however, in the long run the exposure to 
markets with these very different social rules may provide valuable information for innovation.  A 
competing food processor, which operates in only the United States or in Europe, may find that the short 
run efficiency gains come at a severe long run cost if the multinational can leverage the knowledge 
creation across both geographies. 
Negative feedback interactions.  Unlike positive feedback, negative feedback is manifested by social 
interactions involving the dissemination of social rules among those entrepreneurs who form strong 
information ties (Ng, 2001).  Strong information ties breed conformity and social consensus through the 11 
shared understanding of social rules (Ng, 2001). Consistent with social institutional and organizational 
ecology literature (Scott, 1995), these social rules reflect the pressures of the social environment on 
entrepreneurs to conform to institutionalized norms of practice.  Entrepreneurs have incentives to form 
strong information ties, because the access to social rules assists in the formulation of correct plans and 
reduces the uncertainty associated with trying new plans (Ng, 2001; Scott, 1995).  
The transmission of social rules through strong information ties has a negative feedback or 
dampening effect that counters the bifurcating influences introduced by “innovative plans”. The 
recombination of similar plan experiences through strong information ties contributes to the diffusion of 
social rules to which plans converge towards increasingly homogeneous plan choices (Ng, 2001). Since 
bifurcating behaviors rest upon the iterative recombination of diverse elements, this increasing 
homogeneity of plan choices circumvents those innovative experimentations necessary for positive 
feedback to occur (Ng, 2001).   
However, unlike social institutional and organizational ecology theories that presuppose the 
existence of social rules imposed from the macro social environment, these social rules originate from 
the self-organizing process of local coevolution (Ng, 2001). The reciprocal "local" coevolution of 
individual knowledge and social rules generates the internal experimentation necessary for the 
expression of self-organization. According to Hayek (1967), the self-organization of markets occurs 
from the entrepreneurs’ trial and error efforts to form successful plans. In particular, these efforts are 
jointly determined by an entrepreneur’s alertness and those social rules imparted by the experimentation 
efforts of other alert entrepreneurs in the social network. As a result, the social rules found in one’s 
network inform alert entrepreneurial choice and in turn such choice informs the social rules to others. 
This reciprocal interaction results in the self-organization of local social networks (Ng, 2001). As 
successful plans are revealed, entrepreneurs have incentive to form strong information ties so as imitate 
the successful plan formulations (Ng, 2001). The formation of these strong information ties diffuses the 
social rules of successful plans throughout the social network. A self-organizing process results as the 
plan diffusion creates negative feedback tendencies for plan imitation / conformance (Ng, 2001).   12 
The macro environment is comprised of the collective behaviour of such local coevolutionary 
processes.  Social rules arising from the self-organization processes of each social network, thereby, 
constitute the collective social rules of this macro environment. Hence, through the self-organization of 
local coevolutionary processes, the emergence of local social rules gives rise to the endogenous 
formation of the macro environment’s social rules.  The social rules of the macro environment in turn 
constitute a macro deterministic influence that dampens local coevolutionary processes in social 
networks that exhibit positive feedback. 
Nested Coevolution: Macro Coevolution of Knowledge and Social Relations 
Driven by the self-organization of local coevolutionary processes, the macro environment is 
subjected to another form (i.e. more hierarchical form) of coevolution where the collective social 
network relations of strong and weak information ties (i.e. found in all local coevolutionary processes) 
coevolve with the collective knowledge of society.  In particular, because the “local” coevolutionary 
processes contribute to the reciprocal interaction of individual knowledge with the social rules of the 
local environment, these local reciprocal interactions result in an evolving pattern of social network 
relations consisting of changes in strong and weak information ties (Ng, 2001). Through such changes 
in network relations the ordering influences of negative feedback and the chaotic/bifurcating forces of 
positive feedback contend with each other to mitigate and accelerate, respectively, forces for change. 
The collective behavior of all such non-linear processes affects the macro coevolution of the system.  
Specifically, through positive feedback influences, local coevolutionary processes shape macro 
knowledge and social network relations and, through negative feedback, the macro environment shapes 
the underlying local coevolutionary process.  Through the myriad of these non-linear influences that 
comprise the macro environment, the nested coevolutionary behavior of a complex system can 
endogenously create conditions for its own deconstruction. As “local” social rules become increasingly 
disseminated, the revealing of successful plans through the guidance role of social rules diminishes 
competitive advantages that stems from asymmetric knowledge (Ng, 2001). In these increasingly 
competitive conditions, entrepreneurs will no longer rely on the guidance influences of social rules, but 
rather experiment to discover innovative plans (Ng, 2001). Entrepreneurial innovative plans become the 13 
catalyst for a system wide bifurcated change, reflective of Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” (Ng, 
2001).  
Modeling Framework 
Unlike econometric methods that depend upon a logic of uni-directional causality, a 
coevolutionary approach requires methods that encompass multi and bi-directional causal relations that 
extend to many hierarchical levels of organization. Agent-based modeling (Lane, 1993) offers one such 
method (Kauffman, 1993). Agent-based modeling relies upon the construction of computer simulations 
comprised of interacting heterogeneous and rule-based agents operating in artificial worlds (Lane, 
1993). The goal of agent-based simulation is to develop insight on non-linear processes exhibited by 
complex systems (Lane, 1993). It has been used to examine bifurcated, chaos, edge of chaos and self-
organizing behaviors (Ng, 2001) to which such understanding can provide particularly useful insight on 
the complex processes found in food chain systems. These outcomes can reveal behavior not expressible 
by mathematical models, which often yield intractable analytic solutions when complex non-linear 
dynamics are included (Axtell, 2000). Consequently, agent-based method has considerable potential for 
investigating those paradoxical influences that impact the behavior of food supply chains within a 
nested coevolutionary framework. 
An Example Environment 
  Although the modeling framework that will be presented is general in nature, its presentation 
forwards an analytical representation of a nested coevolutionary approach. Such an application has not 
been done to date. To provide a context for its use to address food chain evolution, a brief description of 
an example application will be provided.  A complete description of this example can be found in Ng 
(2001).  In this example setting, the subjective and alert entrepreneurs are populated in a supply / value 
chain market structure. A supply chain market structure was utilized because it incorporates the 
complex interactions typical of food supply chains (Ng, 2001).   
Applied to the context of an agricultural-food market system, this supply / value chain consists 
of an exogenous end-user market sequentially connected to three supply stages –the food processor, 
farmer and life science stages.  Each supply stage contains alternative product-markets.  For grains and 14 
oilseeds in today’s environment, the co-existence and competition between the traditional commodity, 
identity preserved, and vertical integration through financial ownership product-markets is of particular 
interest. In the commodity product-markets, market prices coordinate or link the adjacent stages of the 
supply chain.  Contractual arrangements (often tied to commodity market prices) are used to coordinate 
identity preserved product-markets.  In a vertically integrated product-market, however, production 
costs and administrative controls might be the primary coordination devices.  Again the modeling 
framework will be described in general terms and the preceding examples are offered only to illustrate 
potential application. 
Heterogeneous and Adaptive Agents: Subjective and Alert Entrepreneurs 
  In simulating this nested coevolutionary process, the subjective and alert entrepreneur is used to 
operationalize the heterogeneous and rule-based behavior of agents.  The agent behavior is modeled 
through two interrelated choices: behavioral rules and interaction rules (BRIR) and product-market 
choices. BRIR are heuristics that reflect the selection of resource/input combinations from the social 
interactions an entrepreneur conducts with its social network/local environment. These resource / input 
combinations determine the entrepreneur’s plan to produce a product in a given product-market. These 
BRIR choices yield “local” coevolutionary process because they involve the recombination of 
knowledge experiences (i.e. plan choices) from the dynamic social interactions an entrepreneur conducts 
with its local environment (i.e. evolving social. network). These social interactions transmit failed and 
successful plan choices (i.e. social rules) within an entrepreneur’s social network. As a result, an 
entrepreneur’s BRIR choice is central to the local coevolutionary process.  
Because there are distinct resource/input combinations and thus plans that are more profitable 
for some product-markets than others, the “optimal” choice of BRIR influences an entrepreneur’s 
product-market choice. An entrepreneur must choose to compete in a specific product-market.  In the 
previously described example, the entrepreneur must choose either the commodity, identity preserved or 
vertically integrated product-market. Based on these different product-markets, social interactions 
between similar and dissimilar product-markets constitute strong and weak information ties, 
respectively. Therefore, local coevolutionary processes can consist of the reciprocal interaction with in 15 
and between each product-market while the collective behavior of entrepreneurs in all product-markets 
constitutes the macro coevolutionary behavior of the market system.  
BRIR Choice 
The set of BRIR available to the entrepreneur is summarized in Table 1. There the alternative 
choices for an alert and subjective entrepreneurial behavior are defined as rule following (2 alternatives) 
and / or rule generating (3 alternatives) behaviors.  
 
Table 1: An Entrepreneur's Behavioral and Interaction Rule Choices 
Rule-following: Behavioral Rules  Corresponding Interaction Rule 
1) Imitate the most profitable plan among one's 
product-market group. 
1) Interact only with those entrepreneurs in the 
same product-market group and thus leads to the 
formation of Strong information ties. Generates 
Negative feedback (order) behavior. 
2) Copy and revise upon the most profitable 
entrepreneur among one's product-market group. 
1) Interact only with those entrepreneurs in the 
same product-market group and thus leads to the 
formation of strong information ties. Generates 
Negative feedback (order) behavior. 
Rule-generating: Behavioral Rules  Corresponding: Interaction Rules 
3) Adopt one innovative input from the most 
profitable entrepreneur in one's social network. 
2) "Innovating interaction rule": Interact with 
entrepreneurs in any product-market and thus 
leads to the formation of weak information ties. 
Generates positive feedback behavior. 
4) Choose the first innovative input that one has 
not used before. 
No social interactions. Generates positive 
feedback  behavior.  
5) Recombine an entrepreneur's existing use of 
input combinations with the plan choice of the 
most profitable entrepreneur in one's social 
network.  
2) "Innovating interaction rule": Interact with 
entrepreneurs in any product-market and thus lead 
to the formation of weak information ties. 
Generates positive feedback behavior. 
 
Alert and Subjective Entrepreneurship: Trade Off Function and Constraints 
 
An entrepreneur’s subjective perception of market opportunities is captured by a trade off 
function (equation 1 and its associated constraints, 1a-e), which determines the entrepreneur’s “optimal” 
choice of BRIR. For a given optimal product-market choice, 
*
, , t k s I , this trade off function (Eq. 1) is 
indexed by the k
th entrepreneur residing in a sub-sector of an industry defined by a supply stage, s, (i.e. 
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Subjective and alert entrepreneurship involves the choice of BRIR so as to maximize the trade 
off function subject to a series of behavioral constraints. The problem confronting the entrepreneur can 
be viewed as a variant of an evolving Stackelberg game of imperfect knowledge with n persons that 
exhibit non-linear behaviors.  In describing the entrepreneur’s behavior, the entrepreneur’s subjectivity 
is depicted in term of their perception of the marginal productivity of the resource/input combinations 
(Eq. 1a),  ) (
*
, , , , , t k s
Subj
t x k s I A . This subjectivity can be substituted into a Cobb-Douglas production function 
(Eq. 1b),  ) ( , , , , t k s
Subj
t k s BRIR F , that is separable into unique resource / input combinations,  t k s X , , . In 
addition, each entrepreneur has an initial resource / input allocation  (Eq. 1c) depicting an initial 
heterogeneity of plan choices,  ) | ) ( (
*
, , , , , , , , t k s t k s t k s t k s I BRIR X PL . Social rules as production experience 
are defined in terms of the average past profits,  ) | (
*




t k s I PL − − − Π , earned by an entrepreneur for 
a given plan choice, PL, (Eq. 1d). The addition of equation 1d to the tradeoff function allows 
entrepreneurs to learn from experience. Plans that have earned poor profits will reduce the tradeoff 
value and, thus, the BRIR associated with such plans will be avoided. This depiction captures the social 
rules of local coevolutionary processes (Ng, 2001). In addition, because an entrepreneur’s social 17 
network evolves with changes in knowledge, the diversity of social interactions with other entrepreneurs 
enables each entrepreneur to capture the macro social rules of the environment (i.e. knowledge of other 
social networks). 
Lastly, entrepreneurial “aspirations” (Eq. 1e),  ) (
*
, , , , t k s t k s I Asp − − , stimulates entrepreneurial 
alertness to enact an “optimal” BRIR choice. An entrepreneur’s aspiration is defined in terms of the 
average product-market profits for all plan choices conducted over T-1 periods of entrepreneurial 
experience. With an entrepreneur’s aspiration as an additional argument to the entrepreneur’s trade off 
function (Eq. 1), those BRIR yielding plans that confer “perceived” profits in excess of aspiration levels 
(i.e. average product-market profits) will generate higher trade off values. Therefore, there is a greater 
propensity to identify and pursue such BRIR choices. In addition, this aspiration is also used as a 
behavioral condition (condition 1) where the “optimal” BRIR is chosen only when the previous periods 
entrepreneurial profits,  ) | (
*
, , , , , , t k s
PL
t k s t k s I PL Π , fall below an entrepreneur’s aspirations. Therefore, 
entrepreneurs with higher aspirations (higher subjective expectations of profits for a given product-
market) will have a greater tendency to seek out “optimal” BRIR choices. 
t k s I Asp I PL
Condition
t k s t k s t k s
PL
t k s t k s , , ) ( ) | (
1
*
, , , ,
*
, , , , , , ∀ < Π − −
. 
Product-Market Choice 
An entrepreneur’s product-market choice, 
*
1 , , + t k s I , takes into account the optimal BRIR choice, 
*
, , t k s BRIR , in deciding to enter a product-market. As shown in equation 2, this product-market decision 
is conducted by taking the sum of the maximum of the first term that measures the proportion of the 
cumulative entrepreneurial profits earned in each product-market and the second term that measures the 
proportion of the product-market specific resource / input combination,  ) | ( ˆ *
, ,
*
, , , , , t k s t k s t x k s I BRIR X , 
currently used by the optimal BRIR choice. This second term is used to capture those resource / inputs 
unique to an entrepreneur’s product-market choice. 18 
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An entrepreneur’s choice of product-market is, therefore, based on both past product-market 
experience as well as the current resource / input combination of the optimal BRIR. The entrepreneur 
chooses the product-market that maximizes these arguments. This optimal product-market choice is also 
subject to an initial product-market constraint (Eq. 2a) where each entrepreneur initially has a unique 
perception of the relative attractiveness of the different product-markets.  
Implications for Application 
  The analytical model presented above is based upon a novel approach to understanding 
organizational-environmental relations: a nested micro-macro system of individual entrepreneurial 
choices that simultaneously drive and respond to market evolution.  The application of this model to a 
food supply chain context highlights the paradoxical forces that characterize complex food marketing 
systems. The proposed analytical model offers an alternative to conventional welfare economic 
assessments. It not only incorporates complex systems behavior but more importantly, it rests on a 
different conceptual basis where food sector participants influence welfare outcomes explicitly through 
their investment choices and interactions with other agents that are horizontally and vertically tied to 
them. That is, aggregate industry and supply chain behavior arises from the choices of alert and 
subjective entrepreneurs in an explicit manner – one doesn’t have to resort to “representative” 
homogeneous agents or to tenuous aggregation rules. 
With specific modifications to the general analytical framework above, other behaviors of the 
self-organized supply chain can be examined: the consequences of investment choices in R&D, of entry 
into new product markets, and of building networks among alliance partners. Decision choices in 
complex systems such as food supply chains can often yield unexpected outcomes because of 
interconnectedness and nonlinearities. In the extreme, such decisions can result in bifurcating behaviors. 
The ability to better anticipate unintended consequences has significant value for food policy makers 19 
and sector participants, accounting for complex coevolutionary processes not traditionally incorporated 
in deterministic, simulation techniques. Complexity science, when applied to natural systems, has 
shown that highly structured, rigid systems can cause unfathomably chaotic change when a bifurcation 
event occurs. With a highly regulated or highly interconnected social system, such as a food product 
supply chain, one can expect chaotic outcomes from big events such as a major food safety failure 
(BSE?) or the entry of a new competitor (Wal-Mart in Europe?). One can also expect that a thousand 
small changes within the normal bounds of regulatory control will lead to a greater-than-the-sum-of-
parts outcome. For example, how many small outbreaks of E. coli and Salmonella, coupled with 
“normal” merger activity in food processing, would be sufficient to erode the American consumers’ 
confidence in the food supply? 
Another application concerns the management of knowledge networks through strong and weak 
information ties. This type of social capital in food supply chain networks can be a source of 
competitive advantage, just as physical and human capital assets are the acknowledged bases for scale 
economies and for exploiting experience curves.  From a managerial perspective, simulation of 
alternative chain-level strategies could enhance understanding of the dynamics of knowledge sharing 
and knowledge protection (isolation from competing chains). In addition, attention to the knowledge 
creation and diffusion processes in the new knowledge economy can be of increasing pertinence to 
agricultural policy makers for devising intellectual property right schemes that maximize food chain 
welfare. That is to say, welfare assessment of alternative intellectual property rights regimes (i.e. 
breadth and time duration) can be better examined through explicit analysis of coevolutionary system 
behavior than through static analyses.  20 
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